advanced a crude idea of transmutation. He also recounted his rejection of Agassiz's belief that species were progressively replaced by the divine hand. He neglected altogether his friend Herbert Spencer's early Lamarckian ideas about species development, which were also part of the long history of his encounters with the theory of descent. None of these sources moved him to adopt any version of the transmutation hypothesis.
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The facts of variability, of the struggle for existence, of adaptation to conditions, were notorious enough; but none of us had suspected that the road to the heart of the species problem lay through them, until Darwin and Wallace dispelled the darkness, and the beacon-fire of the "Origin" guided the benighted (Huxley, 1900, 1: 179-83) .
The elements that Huxley indicated-variability, struggle for existence, adaptationform core features of Darwin's conception of natural selection. Thus what Huxley admonished himself for not immediately comprehending was not the fact, as it might be called, of species change but the cause of that change. Huxley's exclamation suggests-and it has usually been interpreted to affirm-that the idea of natural selection was really quite simple and that when the few elements composing it were held before the mind's eye, the principle and its significance would flash out. The elements, it is supposed, fall together in this way: species members vary in their heritable traits from each other; more individuals are produced than the resources of the environment can sustain; those that by chance have traits that better fit them than others of their kind to circumstances will more likely survive to pass on those traits to offspring; consequently, the structural character of the species will continue to alter over generations until individuals appear specifically different from their ancestors.
Yet, if the idea of natural selection were as simple and fundamental as Huxley suggested and as countless scholars have maintained, why did it take so long for the theory to be published after Darwin supposedly discovered it? And why did it then require a very long book to make its truth obvious? In this essay, I will try to answer 3 these questions. I will do so by showing that the principle of natural selection is not simple but complex and that it only gradually took shape in Darwin's mind. In what follows, I will refer to the "principle" or "device" of natural selection, never the "mechanism" of selection. Though the phrase "mechanism of natural selection" comes trippingly to our lips, it never came to Darwin's in the Origin; and I will explain why. I will also use the term "evolution" to describe the idea of species descent with modification.
Somehow the notion has gained currency that Darwin avoided the term because it suggested progressive development. This assumption has no warrant for two reasons.
First, the term is obviously present, in its participial form, as the very last word in the Origin, as well as being freely used as a noun in the last edition of the Origin (1872), in the Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication (1868) , and throughout the
Descent of Man (1871) and The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals
(1872). But the second reason for rejecting the assumption is that Darwin's theory is, indeed, progressivist; and his device of natural selection was designed to produce evolutionary progress.
Darwin's Early Efforts to Explain Transformation
Shortly after he returned from his voyage on H.M.S. Beagle (1831-1836), Darwin began seriously to entertain the hypothesis of species change over time. He had been introduced to the idea through reading his grandfather Erasmus Darwin's Zoonomia 1794-1796), which included speculations about species development; and, while at Edinburgh medical school (1825-1827), he studied Lamarck's Système des animaux sans vertèbres (1801) under the tutelage of Robert Grant, a convinced evolutionist. On the voyage, he carried Lamarck's Histoire naturelle des animaux san vertèbres (1815) (1816) (1817) (1818) (1819) (1820) (1821) (1822) , in which the idea of evolutionary change was prominent. He got another large dose of the Frenchman's ideas during his time off the coast of South America, where he received by merchant ship the second volume of Charles Lyell's Principles of Geology (1831-1833), which contained a searching discussion and negative critique of the fanciful supposition of an "evolution of one species out of another" (Lyell, 1987, 2: 60) .
Undoubtedly the rejection of Lamarck by Lyell and most British naturalists gave Darwin pause; but after his return to England, while sorting and cataloguing his specimens from the Galapagos, he came to understand that his materials supplied compelling evidence for the suspect theory.
In his various early notebooks (January 1837 to June 1838), Darwin began to work out different possibilities to explain species change (Richards, 1987, 85-98) .
Initially, he supposed that a species might be "created for a definite time," so that when its span of years was exhausted, it went extinct and another, affiliated species took its place (Notebooks, 12, 62) . He rather quickly abandoned the idea of species senescence, and began to think in terms of Lamarck's notion of the direct effects of the environment, especially the possible impact of the imponderable fluids of heat and electricity (Notebooks, 175) . If the device of environmental impact were to meet what seemed to be the empirical requirement-as evidenced by the pattern of fossil deposits, going from simple shells at the deepest levels to complex vertebrate remains at higher levels-then it had to produce progressive development. If species resembled ideas, then progressive change would seem to be a natural result, or so Darwin speculated: 5 "Each species changes. Does it progress. Man gains ideas. The simplest cannot help.-becoming more complicated; & if we look to first origin there must be progress" (Notebooks, 175) . Being the conservative thinker that he was, Darwin retained in the Origin the idea that some species, under special conditions, might alter through direct environmental impact as well as the conviction that modifications would be progressive.
Darwin seems to have soon recognized that the direct influence of surroundings on an organism could not account for its more complex adaptations, and so he began constructing another causal device. He had been stimulated by an essay of Frédéric Cuvier, which suggested that animals might acquire heritable traits through exercise in response to particular circumstances. He rather quickly concluded that "all structures either direct effect of habit, or hereditary <& combined> effect of habit" (Notebooks, 259). 1 Darwin, thus, assumed that new habits, if practiced by the population over long periods of time, would turn into instincts; and these latter would eventually modify anatomical structures, thus altering the species. Use-inheritance was, of course, a principal mode of species transformation for Lamarck.
In developing his own theory of use-inheritance, Darwin carefully distinguished his ideas from those of his discredited predecessor-or at least he convinced himself that their ideas were quite different. He attempted to distance himself from the French naturalist by proposing that habits introduced into a population would first gradually become instinctual before they altered anatomy. And instincts-innate patterns of behavior-would be expressed automatically, without the intervention of conscious willpower, the presumptive Lamarckian mode (Notebooks, 292) . By early summer of 1838,
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Darwin thus had two devices by which to explain descent of species with modification: the direct effects of the environment and his habit-instinct device.
Elements of the Theory of Natural Selection
At the end of September 1838, In this passage, he appears to have been wondering how selecting could occur in nature when no agent was picking the few "best individuals" to breed.
In the Autobiography, Darwin indicated that the second idea that prepared the way to divine the significance of Malthus's Essay was that of the struggle for existence.
Lyell, in the Principles of Geology, had mentioned de Candolle's observation that all the plants of a country "are at war with one another" (Lyell, 1830-33, 2: 131) . This kind of struggle, Lyell believed, would be the cause of "mortality" of species, of which fossils gave abundant evidence (Lyell, 1830-33, 2: 130) . In his own reading of Lyell, Darwin took to heart the implied admonition to "study the wars of organic being" (Notebooks, 262). 
The Purpose of Progressive Evolution: Human Beings and Morality
The great peroration at the very end of the Origin of Species asserts a longstanding and permanent conviction of Darwin, namely that the "object," or purpose, of the "war of nature" is "the production of the higher animals" (Origin, 490 At the very end of October 1838, Darwin gave an analytic summary of his developing idea, a neat set of virtually axiomatic principles constituting his device:
Three principles, will account for all These factors may be interpreted as: traits of organisms are heritable (with occasional reversions); these traits vary slightly from generation to generation; and reproduction outstrips food resources (the Malthusian factor). These principles seem very much like those "necessary and sufficient" axioms advanced by contemporary evolutionary theorists: variation, heritability, and differential survival (Lewontin, 1978) . Such analytic reduction does appear to render evolution by natural selection a quite simple concept, as Huxley supposed. However, these bare principles do not identify a causal force that might scrutinize the traits of organisms to pick out just those that could provide an advantage and thus be preserved. Darwin would shortly construct that force as both a moral and an intelligent agent, and the structure of that conception would sink deeply into the language of the Origin.
Natural Selection as an Intelligent and Moral Force
In 1842 In the next section of the essays, Darwin inquired whether variation and selection could be found in nature. Variations in the wild, he thought, would occur much as they 16 did in domestic stocks. But the crucial, two-pronged issue was: "is there any means of selecting those offspring which vary in the same manner, crossing them and keeping their offspring separate and thus producing selected races" (Foundations, 5)? The first of these problems might be called the problem of selection, the second that of swamping out. In beginning to deal with these difficulties (and more to come), Darwin proposed to himself a certain model against which he would construct his device of natural selection. This model would control his language and the concepts deployed in the Origin. In the 1844 Essay, he described the model this way:
Let us now suppose a Being with penetration sufficient to perceive the differences in the outer and innermost organization quite imperceptible to man, and with forethought extending over future centuries to watch with unerring care and select for any object the offspring of an organism produced under the foregoing circumstances; I can see no conceivable reason why he could not form a new race (or several were he to separate the stock of the original organism and work on several islands) adapted to new ends. As we assume his discrimination, and his forethought, and his steadiness of object, to be incomparably greater than those qualities in man, so we may suppose the beauty and complications of the adaptations of the new races and their differences from the original stock to be greater than in the domestic races produced by man's agency (Foundations, 85).
The model Darwin had chosen to explain to himself the process of selection in nature was that of a powerfully intelligent being, one that had foresight and selected animals to produce beautiful and intricate structures. This prescient being made choices that were "infinitely wise compared to those of man" (Foundations, 21). As a wise breeder, this being would prevent back-crosses of his flocks. Nature, the analogue of this being, was thus conceived not as a machine but as a supremely intelligent force.
In the succeeding sections of both essays, Darwin began specifying the analogs for the model, that is, those features of nature that operated in a fashion comparable to the imaginary being. He stipulated, for instance, that variations in nature would be very slight and intermittent due to the actions of a slowly changing environment. But, looking to his model, he supposed that nature would compensate for very gradually appearing variations by acting in a way "far more rigid and scrutinizing" (Foundations, 9). He then brought to bear the Malthusian idea of geometrical increase of offspring, and the consequent struggle for existence that would cull all but those having the most beneficial traits.
Many difficulties in the theory of natural selection were yet unsolved in the essays.
Darwin had not really dealt with the problem of swamping. Nor had he succeeded in working out how nature might select social, or altruistic, instincts, the ultimate goal of evolution. And as he considered the operations of natural selection, it seemed improbable that it could produce organs of great perfection, such as the vertebrate eye.
His strategy for solving this last problem, however, did seem ready to hand-namely, to find a graduation of structures in various different species that might illustrate how organs like the eye might have evolved over long periods of time. Moreover, if natural selection had virtually preternatural discernment, it could operate on exquisitely small variations to produce something as intricate as an eye.
Darwin's Big Species Book: Group Selection and the Morality of Nature
In September 1854, Darwin noted in his pocket diary, "Began sorting notes for would enable him to solve the like problem in human evolution, namely the origin of the altruistic instincts. In the Descent of Man, Darwin would mobilize the model of the social insects precisely to construct a theory of human moral behavior that contained a core of pure, unselfish altruism-that is, acts that benefited others at cost to self, something that could not occur under individual selection (Richards, 1987, 206-19) . Hence, the final goal of evolution, as he originally conceived its telic purpose, could be realized: the production of the higher animals having moral sentiments. Yet not only did Darwin construe natural selection as producing moral creatures, he conceived of natural selection itself as a moral and intelligent agent.
The model of an intelligent and moral selector, which Darwin cultivated in the earlier essays, makes an appearance in the Big Species Book. In the chapter "On Natural Selection," he contrasted man's selection with nature's. The human breeder did not allow "each being to struggle for life"; he rather protected animals "from all enemies."
Further, man judged animals only on surface characteristics and often picked countervailing traits. He also allowed crosses that reduced the power of selection. And finally, man acted selfishly, choosing only that property which "pleases or is useful to him." Nature acted quite differently:
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She cares not for mere external appearances; she may be said to scrutinize with a severe eye, every nerve, vessel & muscle; every habit, instinct, shade of constitution,-the whole machinery of the organization.
There will be here no caprice, no favouring: the good will be preserve & the bad rigidly destroyed (Species Book, 224).
Nature thus acted steadily, justly, and with divine discernment, separating the good from the bad. Nature, in this conception, was God's surrogate, which Darwin signaled by penciling in his manuscript above the quoted passage: "By nature, I mean the laws ordained by God to govern the Universe" (Species Book, 224; see also Brooke, this volume). As Darwin pared away the overgrowth of the Big Species Book, the intelligent and moral character of natural selection stood out even more boldly in the précis, that is, in the Origin of Species.
Natural Selection in the Origin of Species
In the first edition of the Origin, Darwin approached natural selection from two distinct perspectives, conveyed in two chapters whose titles suggest the distinction:
"Struggle for Existence" and "Natural Selection" (chapters 3 and 4). Though their considerations overlap, the first focuses on the details of the operations of selection and the second contains the more highly personified re-conceptualization of its activities. In chapter 3, Darwin proposed that small variations in organisms would give some an advantage in the struggle for life. He then defined natural selection:
Owing to this struggle for life, any variation, however slight and from whatever cause proceeding, if it be in any degree profitable to an individual of any species, . . . will tend to the preservation of that individual, and will generally be inherited by its offspring. The offspring, also, will thus have a better chance of surviving. . . I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved by the term Natural Selection (Origin, 61).
Darwin would explain what he meant by "struggle" a bit later in the chapter, and I will discuss that in a moment. indicates it is the individual that is preserved, in the second part it is the slight variation that is preserved-which latter is the meaning of the phrase "natural selection" (Origin, 61 and 81). The passage draws out "the chicken and egg" problem for Darwin: a trait
gives an individual an advantage in its struggle, so that the individual is preserved, who, in turn, preserves the trait by passing it on to offspring. Finally, the definition looks to the future, when useful traits will be sifted out and the non-useful extinguished, along with their carriers. In the short run, individuals are preserved; in the long run, it is their morphologies that are both perpetuated and slowly change as the result of continued selection.
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"We behold," Darwin observed (using a recurring metaphor), "the face of nature bright with gladness"; but we do not see the struggle that occurs beneath her beaming countenance (Origin, 62) . But what does "struggle" mean and who are the antagonists in a struggle for existence? Darwin said he meant "struggle in a "large and metaphorical sense," which, as he spun out his meandering notion, would cover three or four distinct meanings (Origin, (62) (63) . First, an animal preyed upon will struggle with its aggressor. But as well, two canine animals will also "struggle with one another to get food and live." The image Darwin seems to have had in mind was that of two dogs struggling over a piece of meat. Furthermore, struggle can be used to characterize a plant at the edge of the desert: it struggles "for life against the drought. Malthus, who emphasized the population consequences of dearth. Today, we would say that struggle-granted its metaphorical sense-properly occurs only between members of the same species to leave progeny. Adopting de Candolle's emphasis on the warlike aspects of struggle may have led Darwin to distinguish natural selection from sexual selection, which latter concerns not a death struggle for existence but males' struggling for matting opportunities.
In the chapter "Natural Selection" in the Origin, Darwin characterized his device in this way, pulling phrases from his earlier essays and Big Species Book but rendering them with a biblical inflexion:
Man can act only on external and visible characters: nature cares nothing for appearances, except in so far as they may be useful to any being. She can act on every internal organ, on every shade of constitutional difference, on the whole machinery of life. Man selects only for his own good; Nature only for that of the being which she tends. . . Can we wonder, then, that nature's productions should be far "truer" in character than man's productions; that they should be infinitely better adapted to the most complex conditions of life, and should plainly bear the stamp of far higher workmanship? (Origin, (83) (84) Thus when the implications of his model of intelligent nature were recognized, Darwin 27 had to invoke as analogue a Lamarckian scenario. Today, we assume that small breeding groups isolated by physical barriers would more likely furnish the requisite conditions for natural selection.
Third, a wise selector that has the good of creatures at heart would produce a progressive evolution, one that created ever more improved organization, which Darwin certainly thought to be the case. He believed that more recent creatures had accumulated progressive traits and would triumph over more ancient creatures regardless of the environments in which they might compete (Origin, . He summed up his view in the last section of the Origin: "And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection" (Origin, 489). This passage, which remains unchanged through the several editions of the Origin, is an index of both Darwin's moral conception of nature and of its progressive intent. The moral overlay of the passage has blotted out the winnowing force of selection, which hardly works for the benefit of every creature.
And, as Darwin made clear in the third edition, the "improvements" wrought by selection will "inevitably lead to the gradual advancement of the organization of the greater number of living beings throughout the world" (Variorum, 221; my emphasis).
Fourth, such an intelligent agency would not merely select for each creature's good, but also for that of the community. Darwin, in the fifth and sixth editions of the Origin, extended his model of family selection to one that operated simply on a community: "In social animals it [natural selection] will adapt the structure of each individual for the 28 benefit of the community; if this in consequence profits by the selected change" (Variorum, 172).
Finally, the intelligent and moral character of natural selection would produce the goal that Darwin had sighted early in his notebooks, namely the production of the higher animals with their moral sentiments. Darwin thus concluded his volume with the Miltonic and salvific vision that he harbored from his earliest days:
Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows. There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed laws of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved (Origin, 490).
Darwin's vision of the process of natural selection was anything but mechanical and brutal. Nature, while it may have sacrificed a multitude of its creatures, did so for the higher "object," or purpose, of creating beings with a moral spine-out of death came life more abundant. We humans, Darwin believed, were the goal of evolution by natural selection.
Notes
